There would seem to be a need for a rationalist to explain as a matter of rationality the entirety of the mental process that goes into the formulation of an original thought, as in a new hypothesis in science. (It is similar to the contortions of a strict empiricist 'demonstrating' how externally generated inputs account for all mental ouput.) Otherwise, wouldn't the non-rationality of that part of the process compromise the rationality--therefore, for a strict rationalist, the validity--of whatever followed from it? The thing (for me) is, I thought Piece's intent was to move away from both strict rationalism and strict empiricism--but I could simply be wrong, either about his intent or the relation of "abduction" to it.

On the normative end, that does seem to me to suggest the postmodernist critique of science. 'Science' is relegated in that critique to the same status as any belief-based--therefore ultimately non-rational--worldview, making it fundamentally no different from any theology or ideology.

As I understand it, though, postmodernists got there by equating rationality with ideology as a starting point. They failed, like the originators of ideologies did, to recognze the essential place of secular--but stilll non-rational--beliefs in ideology. In their confusion they have mistakenly applied a valid critique of (belief-based) ideology to all instances of 'the rational', to include science as a rationalistic approach to knowledge.