Better Governance Requires Leaving Ideology Behind
and egoism — and recognizing the legitimate limit of theology
Ideology was purposely developed to replace theology — and egoism — in the governance of society with a rational approach to that unavoidable human task. It delivered an approach to governance based on secular beliefs rather than sacral beliefs, the bases of theologies. [All that follows refers to an ‘approach to governance’, to include ‘organizing principles’, not political arguments centering on particular policies or programs to be adopted (or not) for any particular community/society/nation-state.]
Both theologies and ideologies, being bodies of thought, are conceptual constructs. Building such things upon a non-rational basis — foundation — i.e., with one or more beliefs as starting points, means that the whole of any such thing is ultimately non-rational.
The upshot is that ideologies can be no more rational than theologies are. Non-rational is not the same thing as irrational (though the former must always be present in the latter). Accepting (or rejecting, for that matter) any belief, however, be it secular or sacral, is in the end, as Soren Kierkegaard put it (though referring specifically to sacral beliefs), a “leap of faith.”
That does not make beliefs invalid. Indeed, all beliefs (including irrational beliefs) are absolutely valid — true — for whoever holds any belief.
It does, however, make all beliefs purely personal truths. Any belief is only valid for whoever happens to accept one. Rationally, no other person can be expected to abide by — act on the basis of — any belief of any person. [Yet, it is the case that beliefs — secular or sacral — can legitimately inform individuals’ participation in a democratic political process, including lawmaking as part of it (beyond the scope of this effort, but addressed in the linked article, below).]
The problem for ideology as an approach to governance is obvious: the organizing principle(s) of society are not shared by all of the members of any (civilized) society. That sets up society for either endless conflict of a fundamentalist kind or a totalitarianism, in which one viewpoint is forced upon all of society. [Non-civilized societies have enjoyed a uniformity in that regard, with an organizing principle of ‘one for all and all for one’, but no civilized society ever has or ever could emulated that kind of universality; that principle follows for those societies from the very material conditions — sheer survival — that civilization was ‘invented’ to overcome.]
Four ideological traditions have developed in Modern times. [‘Definitions’ given herein are not claimed to be the ‘final word’, only feasible descriptions for present purposes.] Liberalism (referring to the meta-ideology, not specifically the political ideology) is based on a belief in human ‘equality’ (in some sense) and the existence of a priori ‘Rights’, such as ‘Natural Rights’, most pointedly including a ‘Right to liberty’. Marxism, despite Marx’s claim that it is “scientific,” takes equality as the organizing principle of society to a logical endpoint. (“Exploitation” cannot be ‘wrong’ without a belief in ‘equality’.) Fascism, in whatever guise, is based on a belief in the inherent superiority of some particular group of people. (The authoritarianism we are witnessing today in many nations, which is often incorrectly labeled as ‘Fascism’, is actually egoistic demagoguery.) Nationalism is a belief in the inherent superiority of a particular nation-state. (‘Love of country’, which has always had an element of chauvinism, to say the least, was encouraged as part of the development of Modern nation-states, but Nationalism developed in the 1800’s, mostly as a misappropriation of Darwin’s ideas.) Nationalism is closely related to Fascism in one sense, but in the latter the supposed source of superiority is not a mere geopolitical unit, a nation-state (though one of those can be claimed as the ‘homeland’ of the most special group), but something more essential, e.g. the Nazis’ focus on ‘blood’/’race’, a ‘nation’ as a fundamentally related group of people — hyper-culturally if not biologically.
It is possible for any of those beliefs to be sacral, with reference to some spiritual realm, or essence, or other thing. They can also be secular, with no reference to any spiritual anything. If sacral, such beliefs are appendages on a system of belief that has a ‘higher’ source. It is as secular beliefs that they are the bases — foundations — of ideologies.
All of that does cause many people to confuse their ideology with their theology (and vice versa). It does suggest, however, that ideologies do have a potential for universality that theologies lack. Ideologies are — or at least can be — open to both sacralists (of any tradition) and secularists, whereas a theology excludes both secularists and sacralists of any other tradition. Of course, many people hold both secular and sacral beliefs and individuals can borrow from different theologies and ideologies — but therein lies the potential for confusion. The point is that, while any theology or ideology, being an abstraction, could possibly become universal — be shared by all people — ideologies don’t (necessarily) have the intrinsic exclusivity that theologies have. As an example, Marx was vehemently atheistic, but a sacralist can still be against exploitation and in favor of a Marxist society(/world) — understanding that the old Soviet Union had about as much in common with Marx’s idea of a communist society as Stalin, as a person, had in common with Winston Churchill or President Roosevelt.
All of that is important because the potential of ideologies for universality contributed mightily to misleading thinkers of yesteryear into thinking that ideologies are rational (besides simply insisting that this or that personal truth was ‘universal’). That is a categorical error that postmodernists have perpetuated (below).
All of those ideological traditions developed in Europe. The development of ideology came after the development of Modern science on that continent (in its basics as an intellectual process, at least). The two are not unrelated.
People in Europe were driven to thinking about a definitive answer to the question of how society should be governed by the political strife that had plagued that continent for centuries. Kings/Queens and Popes, with their representatives, all vied incessantly for the power to rule (over as much of the world as possible). Then came the ‘Reformation’, followed inevitably by the ‘Counter-Reformation’. Egoism and religious beliefs (always impossible for any observer to distinguish) had infected Europe with never-ending political violence of every stripe. Some alternative was seen to be desperately needed. [The first of the four ideological traditions, Liberalism, was developed by John Locke during England’s comparatively not-so-violent but long-lived transition (almost a half-century) from an all-but-absolute monarchy to a strong and independent Parliament (which included along the way the world’s first Modern dictatorship, Cromwell’s ‘Protectorate’).]
The obvious rationality of science suggested that rationality could offer a path to determining, once and for all, how society ought to be governed. Above all, science was secular, not sacral. It was seen to lead to objective truths, which, because they were objective, as opposed to the subjective — personal — truths of egoism and religious beliefs, were universally valid for all people. So: secular = rational = objective = universal.
The thinkers who brought ideology into the world failed to recognize the existence of secular beliefs in their thinking that, being non-rational beliefs, could be no more ‘objective’ than religious beliefs — or egoism — could be. Governance remained subject to personal truths.
Postmodernists insist that they (led by Jacques Derrida) have rendered that transitive sequence (above) invalid by recognizing the impossibility of ‘objectivity’, thus making universality regarding any organizing principle impossible. Yet, while it is the case that no human being can ever be purely objective, i.e., totally free of subjective influences, we do perceive a material — objective, in that sense — existence. Experiences of that existence can be necessarily universal.
Still, the impossibility of ‘objectivity’ has led postmodernists to reject ‘foundationalism’ in itself: since universality (in the sense of being necessarily universal) is (therefore) impossible for any and all ideologies (and theologies), to put forth any organizing principle for society is to place it in an arbitrarily ‘privileged’ position. Postmodernists have failed to see that it is beliefs as the foundations of both ideologies and theologies that makes both of those kinds of constructs purely personal truths that can only obtain a foundational status for society by being arbitrarily ‘privileged’ over any other truths.
In short, postmodernists are right about the inadequacy of ideology as an approach to governance, but for the wrong reasons. Even so, all of that does suggest that an approach to governance following from a universal (and universally verifiable) experience of material existence would be universally valid: valid for any and every human being. Its being an organizing principle would therefore not be a matter being arbitrarily privileged. [Even if more than one possible organizing principle could be found to follow from material existence, rational arguments could be employed for a society to decide which principle to adopt — rational persuasion, not the sheer “contests of power” (from Michel Foucault) that differing beliefs inspire.]
Meanwhile, Critical Theory (in its initial iteration, as developed by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno starting in the 1940’s) recognized the totalitarian potential in all ideologies — but failed to see that it is the presence of beliefs as the foundations of ideologies that generates that ‘totalizing’ impetus. Even Liberalism, it turns out, is not immune. Many people are convinced that contemporary ‘critical theory’ seems bent on demonstrating the totalitarian potential of a belief in equality. At the same time, the newfangled ‘conservatism’ abroad in the U.S., especially in its religious manifestation, appears to be working its way toward making liberty a basis of a totalitarian form of governance, by establishing some criterion for ‘legitimate’ access to liberty (such as, say, professing to be a Christian).
Eventually ideology (aided and abetted by advances in technology related to warfare) fueled violence in Europe on a scale, geographically and humanly, that dwarfed anything that had gone before it. WWI was the product Nationalism. WWII was a three-way between Fascism, Marxism, and Liberalism. The ‘Cold War’ between Marxism and Liberalism that followed WWII enveloped the entire planet and very nearly triggered on more than one occasion a thermonuclear exchange in which any sliver of humanity that might have survived would have been ‘bombed back to the Stone Age’ (a threat often leveled, especially back then, at any opponent of America).
So ideology failed to deliver a rational approach to the governance of society. Yet, people are completely convinced that at least one ideological tradition — the one to which they adhere — is rational. Given the failures in governance and the crimes against humanity associated with all four ideological traditions, the association in people’s minds of ideology with rationality has given rationality itself a bad name — something postmodernists seem to be certain they can’t overstate. Moreover, the adherents of any ideology are totally convinced that its supposed rationality makes the belief(s) on which it is based not mere personal truths, but undeniably universal truths that it is just plain morally wrong to deny (the starting point for sacralists regarding their beliefs). For sure, there are ranges of intensity of adherence for both ideologists and theologists. Even so, any insistence of any person(s) on the rationality of any belief(s) or belief-based conceptual construct can be nothing but self-delusion (at best — and a vehicle for lusting after power at worst).
If its foundation in beliefs renders ideology null and void as an approach to governance that is ‘better than’ theology or even egoism, what is left to say about those?
In Sapiens, Yuval Noah Harari insists that there is no meaningful difference between ideology and theology because, essentially, both are all about personal beliefs. His thesis and the one being related here agree obviously to a point, but, as already suggested above, those two kinds of conceptual constructs are also very different. Besides the difference between secular and sacral, one meaningful difference between ideologies and theologies is the differing focus of the two. In the former the focus is on relations among people within society as a whole; the latter focus on the individual.
To be sure, both theologies and ideologies have implications for individuals and societies. It is a matter of emphasis.
Still, a focus on individuals makes theologies compatible with the strictly rational approach to governance related in the linked article (still below). Governance includes self-governance, people taking it upon themselves to act as they should. For individuals, this strictly rational approach to governance boils down to five absolute prohibitions regarding our actions in seeking whatever we want in this world: no killing, harming, coercing, stealing, or manipulating (which includes lying, cheating, etc.). This author knows of no theology that would reject any of those prohibitions. So long as theologies stuck to a focus on individuals, they and this strictly rational approach to governance could readily coexist (reiterating that beliefs — sacral and secular — can legitimately inform individuals’ participation in a democratic political process).
There would, however, be no place for egoism. Egoism is not the same thing as egotism.
The latter is bad enough. It involves a sense of superiority usually following from some very real manifestation of being far above average, as in intelligence or some other ability or talent, which then gets translated into a generalized sense of superiority. Beyond simply making a person unpleasant to be around, it can itself lead people to disregard other people’s persons and interests, which can lead to particular acts that are unjust: violate the prohibitions noted above.
Egotism is not a necessary precursor for egoism, but it certainly morph into egoism. A person infected with egoism is convinced of a kind of superiority that transcends egotism. Such a person believes that any thought or ‘feeling’ — intuition — or any other product of that person’s subjective self is, due to its source, an absolute truth. For sure, such a person can be completely mediocre (or less) in any respect. In more recent history Hitler and Mussolini are prime examples of egoism. That they are associated with ideologies exemplifies how those can be used as vehicles for egoism. As noted above, the contemporary rise of authoritarianism is an outbreak of egoism (one that hardly ever references ideology — or theology).
As also noted above, there is functionally no difference between egoism and any belief-infused ‘will to power’ (to borrow a phrase from Friedrich Nietzsche). For that matter, since the only reason any belief is true is a person’s (non-rational) acceptance of the belief, to insist that other people must accept our beliefs because they are ‘true’ is actually a form of egoism.
What we need is a strictly rational approach to governing the governance of society, one that is not egoism and does not involve any belief(s). In this article* such an approach to governance is related as an advance in Liberalism — because that is the only ideological tradition to attempt to put justice first. Really, it is an advance from Liberalism. It leaves behind that belief-based approach the governance of society — as well as all belief-based approaches to it, including any sacral ones. The truth of it can only be the result of rationality, not a leap of faith or egoistic (or even egotistic) insistence upon the truth of it.
Albert Einstein was not being egoistical or egotistical when he announced that, as it turns out, “Energy equals Mass multiplied by a constant (the speed of light) squared.” Neither is it egoistical or egotistical to ‘announce’ that, as it turns out, justice follows from the observation (from Warren J. Samuels) within that same (perceived) material existence that human beings have no choice but to effect choices, i.e., choose among perceived alternatives and take action to bring that choice to fruition.
That makes choosing integral to being human. That makes justice people’s respecting one another’s capacity to choose, beginning with anyone’s choosing whether/how/to what extent to be involved whenever any choice is being effected.
That this ethic will not possibly be recognized by all people, or even fully realized at all times and in all places by people who do recognize it, does not invalidate it as an ethic or a universally valid organizing principle for society that ought to be realized whenever and wherever that would be possible. We’re not talking about a Utopia, but ‘only’ a better — more just — community/society/nation-state/world. A demonstrably universally valid organizing principle trumps, if you will, any organizing principle that isn’t demonstrably universally valid.
For all that, any existing Liberal society that came to be governed by this ‘New Liberalism’ (not to be confused with neoliberalism) would not look any different. It would have the same institutional structure. Yet, while the institutional structure of the society would not change, its functioning — its effects on people — would be transformed, especially in the economy. Liberty would be maximized — but as a product of justice, not its source, or foundation, etc. For justice, ‘equality’ would be rendered an unnecessary complication: all that would matter for justice is that the beings involved were humans.
As an approach to governing society this conception of justice necessarily has implications for individuals, the political process, and the economy. It is vitally important that, because it is strictly rational, this approach to justly governing governance is self-limiting to and within those areas of human existence. It does not contain any impetus towards totalitarianism.
This approach to just governance involves no belief at any point. Obviously, it has nothing to do with egoism. It would deliver for humanity that which ideology promised but failed to deliver.
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*Linked article is here in Medium, but — for the benefit of any ‘guest readers’ — not behind the paywall.